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Experimental Philosophy is part of a growing trend in philosophy where scientific methods—formal and empirical—are brought to bear on questions of philosophical relevance. Experimental philosophers typically rely on the methods of experimental psychology to study people’s intuitions—which, by stipulation, we take to be relatively fast, automatic, non-reflective judgments that apply concepts to particular objects, actions, events, or situations—about philosophical issues (causation, reference, free will, consciousness, right, permissible, etc.). Intuitions are used in various ways by philosophers—including as support for conceptual analysis (Goldman, 2007), claims about common sense (e.g., Block, 2004), and premises of arguments (e.g., Kripke, 1972/1980, 42)—and the methods of experimental philosophers can be brought to bear on all these uses. 
	While experimental philosophers are typically concerned with understanding the psychological sources of intuitions (what mechanisms generate some specific intuition?), whether a given intuition is widespread (does everybody have a given intuition?), and whether an intuition-producing mechanism is reliable (does it deliver accurate information that can be used in philosophical theorizing?), they could also study behaviors, provided that these are of philosophical relevance.  For instance, to determine whether philosophical training in ethics promotes moral behavior, Eric Schwitzgebel (2009) has shown that ethics books are more likely to be stolen from university libraries than comparable books in other fields of philosophy. 
	So, how exactly do experimental philosophers study intuitions?  Experimental philosophers usually begin by constructing one or several vignettes (hypothetical stories).  They then present the vignette(s) to participants, analyze the data, and consider what the judgments made by the participants reveal about the intuitions under investigation.  The use of vignettes is not the only way to study intuitions though.  Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Robert Goldberg, and Shaun Nichols (ms) have measured reaction times to show that people use low-level cues to classify an entity as an agent and attribute conscious mental states to the entity. Examining what distinguishes philosophers’ skills from non-philosophers’, Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Adam Feltz, Richard Scheines, and Edouard Machery (2010) relied on a social-psychological questionnaire (the Cognitive Reflection Test) to highlight an aspect of philosophers’ temperament: These tend to be more reflective than equally educated non-philosophers.  The work of psychologists such as Mark Alicke, Fiery Cushman, Joshua Greene, Tania Lombrozo, Jen Wright and Liane Young is also closely related to the interests of experimental philosophers, and these psychologists routinely use methods that go beyond recording the judgments elicited by vignettes.  For instance, Greene and colleagues have used brain imagery (2001) and cognitive load methods (2008) to examine the nature of the processes leading to permissibility judgments in trolley cases. 
	Although experimental philosophers share much in common, there are some important differences among experimental philosophers regarding the role that intuitions should play in philosophy. Roughly, revisionists do not challenge the use of intuitions in philosophy, but hold that experimental methods can make philosophers’ use of intuitions more reliable, while eliminativists are skeptical of the role of at least some types of intuitions in philosophy.  We will discuss some prominent examples of each approach in turn.
	There are several types of revisionist projects.  Some revisionists uncover what intuitions people actually have, and use these intuitions to make philosophical arguments. For example, Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery (forthcoming) have provided some evidence that ascriptions of conscious mental states depend on the extent to which the ascribed mental states (seeing a color, smelling an odor, having an emotion, feeling pain, etc.) are valenced (i.e., have an affective component).  These findings challenge the common philosophical claim that phenomenal consciousness is “the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives’’ (Chalmers, 1995, 207). Joshua Knobe (2006, forthcoming) has provided a wealth of evidence suggesting that, when mental states are ascribed to an agent on the basis of her behavior, mental state attribution is influenced by the moral nature of her behavior. For instance, when judging whether someone intentionally brought about a foreseen side effect, people judge that harmful, but not helpful side-effects, are intentional.  Knobe uses this finding to challenge the view that folk psychology is essentially used for prediction and explanation.  Eddy Nahmias, Steve Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner (2006) have argued that ordinary people do not think that free will is incompatible with determinism. Their results suggest that incompatibilist philosophers have erroneously argued that the burden of proof falls on compatibilists on the grounds that compatibilism is a counter-intuitive position. Other revisionists are concerned with how intuitions are generated, often to argue that some intuitions (but not others) are produced by unreliable mechanisms. Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe’s (2007) results suggest that people tend to have compatibilist intuitions when thinking in concrete, emotional terms, but that they tend to have incompatibilist intuitions when thinking in abstract, cognitive terms.  They then argue that the compatibilist intuitions should be discarded on the grounds that they are biased by emotions.
	Eliminativists are concerned with uncovering a variety of unwanted psychological influences on some types of intuitions, and they use their empirical findings to argue that these intuitions cannot serve as reliable evidence in philosophical theorizing (Weinberg, 2007).  Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Steve Stich (2004) have shown, for example, that intuitions about the reference of proper names vary across cultures: East-Asians are more likely to have descriptivist intuitions, while Westerners are more likely to have causal-historical intuitions. Since intuitions about reference appear to be influenced by a factor that arguably should not matter (viz. culture) and since there is no principled way to privilege certain intuitions, one might reasonably doubt that intuitions about reference should have a role in the philosophy of language.  Another way to assess the reliability of intuitions is to see whether they are subject to context and ordering effects.  Steve Swain, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan Weinberg (2008) have thus provided some evidence that people are less likely to ascribe knowledge in the Truetemp case when this case is presented after a clear case of knowledge than when it is presented after a clear case of ignorance.  Thus, widespread disagreement and context, ordering, and demographic effects can all be used by the eliminativist to show that certain intuitions are unreliable and should thus be eliminated from philosophical practice.
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